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DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS IN FLORIDA CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS: SHOULD THEY SURVIVE?
JOHN F. YETTER*
Pursuant to a Concurrent Resolution of the 1988 Florida Legislature,
the Supreme Court of Florida created a commission which is presently
studying the use of depositions by the defense in criminal prosecutions.
In this Article, Dean Yetter, a member of that commission, traces the
history of criminal defense depositions in Florida, explores the
arguments which shaped last session's legislative debate, and identifies
available options for reform.
F LORIDA is one of a small minority of states which permit the de-
fense to take discovery depositions in criminal prosecutions. I The
1988 Florida Legislature considered proposed legislation which would
have abolished discovery depositions in criminal prosecutions. In the
end it settled for a Concurrent Resolution asking the Supreme Court of
Florida to address the issue of discovery depositions.2 The Concurrent
Resolution called upon the supreme court to appoint a commission com-
prised of representatives from the law enforcement community, the
prosecution, public and private criminal defense counsel, victims' rights
organizations, the judiciary, The Florida Bar, and the legislature. The
proposed commission would consider various problems with discovery
depositions and report its findings and recommendations to the supreme
* Roberts Professor of Criminal Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Florida
State University College of Law. B.S., B.A., 1963, Lehigh University; J.D., 1967, Duquesne
University School of Law; LL.M., 1968, Yale Law School. The author has been appointed to the
Criminal Discovery Commission by the Supreme Court of Florida. The author also serves on the
Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, and is Chairman of the Criminal Law Section of the Flor-
ida Bar. This Article reflects the author's own views and not those of the Commission.
1. Five states permit criminal defense discovery depositions. In Florida, New Hampshire,
North Dakota and Vermont the defense may take discovery depositions as of right. Florida: FIA.
R. Cux. P. 3.220(d); New Hampshire: N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 517.13 (1987); North Dakota:
N.D. R. Cam.. P. 15; Vermont: VT. R. Cmim. P. 15. In Texas, the defense may take depositions,
but they first must seek court approval. Texas: TEX. CaMs. PRoc. CODE ANN . § 39.02 (Vernon
1979).
Discovery depositions are not available in federal criminal prosecutions. See FED. R. CRam. P.
15-16.
2. HCR 1679, Reg. Sess., 1988 Fla. Laws 2442.
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court. The court, in turn, was urged to issue an opinion by April 1,
1989, adopting appropriate changes in the discovery deposition rule.'
On July 7, 1988, the supreme court appointed a fourteen-member
Criminal Discovery Commission (Commission) to perform the mission
specified in the Concurrent Resolution. At the time of this writing the
Commission is meeting to hear testimony, and its report to the court is
due February 1, 1989. 4
3. The text of the Concurrent Resolution reads as follows:
Be It Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Florida, the Senate
Concurring:
That the Legislature urges the Supreme Court to give due consideration to the petition
submitted by the State Attorneys of Florida and institute the changes in Rule 3.220(d),
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, necessary to solve any problems that exist in the
misuse of the rule. The court is requested to appoint, by July 1, 1988, a Commission on
Criminal Discovery to consider various issues related to the use of discovery depositions
in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court is urged to include a balanced representa-
tion of law enforcement, prosecution, public and private criminal defense counsel, vic-
tims rights organizations, the judiciary, The Florida Bar, and the Legislature in the
appointment of members to the commission.
The Legislature requests the commission to consider:
(1) Protection for victims and other witnesses.
(2) Limiting depositions to only essential witnesses.
(3) Prohibiting the defendant from attending the deposition unless good cause is
shown.
(4) Use of technological advances to reduce costs and scheduling problems.
(5) Potential savings of public funds and the time of law enforcement, witnesses, pro-
secutors, defense counsel and court personnel that may be derived by employing alterna-
tive discovery techniques.
(6) Any other appropriate issues.
The commission is requested to report its findings and recommendations to the Su-
preme Court by February 1, 1989, and the court is requested to issue an opinion adopt-
ing the appropriate changes to Rule 3.220(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, by
April 1, 1989.
Id.
4. The Florida Supreme Court's administrative order appointing the Commission reads as
follows:
The legislature . .. has requested this Court to appoint a Commission on Criminal
Discovery to consider various issues related to the use of discovery depositions in crimi-
nal proceedings, and has requested the Commission to report its findings and recommen-
dations to this Court by February 1, 1989.
Accordingly, the Court hereby creates as a committee of the Florida Supreme Court, a
Criminal Discovery Commission, and appoints the following to the Commission: Ed
Austin, State Attorney; Walter Beckham, Esquire; Gerald Bennett, Professor, University
of Florida; Patricia Cocalis, Circuit Judge; Al Datz, Esquire; Dan Hurley, Circuit
Judge; Don Middlebrooks, Esquire; Stanley Morris, Circuit Judge; Chandler R. Muller,
Esquire; Richard C. Parker, Esquire; Parker Thomson, Esquire; Sylvia Walbolt, Es-
quire; John Yetter, Professor, Florida State University; Jim York, Esquire.
Judge Stanley Morris will chair the Commission and Judge Dan Hurley will serve as
Vice Chairperson.
Staff for the Commission will be supplied by the Office of State Court Administrator.
The Legislature provided no funds for the work of the Commission. Reasonable and
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The purpose of this Article is to review the history of discovery depo-
sitions in criminal cases in Florida, to describe the deliberations and ar-
guments in the 1988 Florida Legislature, and to discuss some of the
available options for reform.
I. HISTORICAL DEBATE ABoUT CRMNAL DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS
A debate arose during the 1960's about whether discovery by the ac-
cused in criminal cases should be expanded. The principal arguments
against broad criminal discovery had been summarized by Chief Justice
Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Tune.' He
wrote that broad discovery would facilitate perjured testimony, would
lead to bribery and the intimidation of witnesses, and would be a "One-
way Street" favoring the accused, because the privilege against self-in-
crimination protected defendants from reciprocal disclosures.6 Chief
Justice Vanderbilt also wrote that the favorable experience with broad
discovery in England could not be duplicated in the United States, since
the English were a more law-abiding society.7
In 1963, United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan deliv-
ered an important lecture, later printed as a law review article, arguing
for more liberal discovery for the accused." Justice Brennan said that
under the prevailing limited discovery rules the prosecution enjoyed an
unfair trial advantage-the scales of justice were not "evenly bal-
anced." 9 Brennan thought this was particularly disadvantageous to
court-appointed counsel who had neither the time nor the resources for
careful preparation.' 0 He specifically addressed the arguments raised by
Chief Justice Vanderbilt in State v. Tune." He doubted whether fair
discovery would stimulate perjury and said such a view cast unfair as-
persions on the defense bar. 12 Judicial protective orders, Brennan wrote,
would be adequate to guard against witness intimidation. 3 He did not
necessary expenses incurred by Commission members in the course of Commission work
will be paid by the Office of State Court Administrator.
This Commission shall terminate upon the filing of its report to this Court, unless
extended prior thereto.
In re Criminal Discovery Commission, Fla. Admin. Order (July 7, 1988) (on file with Clerk, Su-
preme Court of Florida).
5. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
6. Id. at 209-11, 98 A.2d at 884-85.
7. Id. at 219, 98 A.2d at 889.
8. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 279.
9. Id. at 285.
.10. Id. at 286-87.
11. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
12. Brennan, supra note 8, at 291.
13. Id. at 292.
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believe that the privilege against self-incrimination would unfairly pro-
tect the defense from reciprocal disclosures; instead, he noted that police
investigators have ample opportunity to collect evidence after the of-
fense, including the ability to interrogate the suspect incommunicado.
14
Finally, Brennan observed that even if Americans were less law-abiding
than the English, Canadians were certainly not remarkably different
from Americans, and Canada allows for liberal discovery to the de-
fense. 15
Justice Brennan conceded that broadened discovery would undoubt-
edly increase the likelihood of the problems envisioned by Chief Justice
Vanderbilt. Nevertheless, he believed that strong judicial supervision
would be an adequate safeguard against abuses, and that "[t]he gain to
the public interest in the pure and just administration of the criminal law
is well worth the risks."16
As a result of this debate, throughout the 1960's and 1970's defen-
dants generally were afforded more liberal discovery in criminal prose-
cutions. Discovery depositions, however, were not favored by the
majority. In 1970, the American Bar Association (ABA) rejected the
proposition that depositions should be available as a matter of right in
all criminal cases. Instead, the ABA's Mininimum Standards on Crimi-
nal Justice, reflecting the majority view, contained the following state-
ment:
That the defendant should have the right to take depositions in a
criminal case for discovery purposes was seriously considered by the
Advisory Committee but was rejected by a majority as a minimum
standard. Although such a right is granted in civil cases in many
jurisdictions, there are different considerations in the criminal process.
First, there is no inherent limitation of cost on the conduct of
unnecessary depositions, because in many cases the costs of the defense
must be borne by the state; and it would be manifestly unfair to grant
the right only to defendants who are able to finance their own defense.
Second, if stated as a right, the need to take depositions might be
construed as part of the adequacy of representation required by the
constitutional right to counsel. Third, the imposition on civilian
witnesses may discourage their coming forward in criminal cases. And,
finally, underlying the importance of these considerations is the belief
that depositions in addition to the disclosures otherwise required by
these standards will not be necessary in most criminal cases. Under its
responsibilities in bringing a criminal case, the prosecution will
14. Id. at 292-93.
15. Id. at 293.
16. Id. at 295.
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ordinarily possess written statements or transcripts of testimony of
potential witnesses of such completeness that additional interrogation
by the defense attorney, prior to trial, will be of only marginal value in
most cases. Moreover, anything of which the prosecution has
knowledge, in addition to the statements, which may tend to negate
guilt of the accused must also be disclosed.
17
On the other hand, the 1975 Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure
did provide for discovery depositions as of right.18 The commentary to
the rule offered the following rationale:
Making the opportunity to take depositions generally available seems
especially justifiable in light of these Rules' eliminating preliminary
hearings where the defendant is not in custody. . .. Depositions
provide much greater flexibility in scheduling than do preliminary
hearings, and cost less because they do not require the presence of a
judicial officer or the use of a courtroom. Further, since they will
normally occur at a later point in the proceedings than would the
preliminary hearings, the parties will be more likely to dispense with
them if they find that they can obtain sufficient information by such
means as interviewing the witnesses or examining their statements. The
parties are unlikely to resort to the use of depositions unless they think
it is necessary and [protective orders are] available to prevent abuse.
The greater availability of information made possible by depositions
will increase the likelihood of dispositions short of trial. 19
17. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 87-88 (1970).
18. The text of Rule 431 reads as follows:
[Depositions.]
(a) When taken. At any time after the defendant has appeared, any party may take the
testimony of any person by deposition, except:
(1) The defendant may not be deposed unless he consents and his lawyer, if he has
one, is present or his presence is waived;
(2) A discovery deposition may be taken after the time set by the court only with leave
of court;
(3) A deposition to perpetuate testimony may be taken only with leave of court, which
shall be granted upon motion of any party if it appears that the deponent may be able to
give material testimony but may be unable to attend a trial or hearing; and
(4) Upon motion of a party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the taking of
the deposition does or will unreasonably annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or a
party, the court in which the prosecution is pending or the court of the [district] where
the deposition is being taken may order that the deposition not be taken or continued or
may limit the scope and manner of its taking. Upon demand of the objecting party or
deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make
the motion.
Attendance of witnesses and production of documentary evidence and objects may be
compelled by subpoena under Rule 731.
U rF. R. Cm. P. 431, 10 U.L.A. 130(1974).
19. Id. commentary at 131.
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In 1978 the ABA modified its position by liberalizing discovery
through "open file" disclosures and by partially rejecting the more criti-
cal analysis of discovery depositions it espoused in 1970. 20 However, the
ABA's revision continued to exclude discovery depositions as a matter
of right. 21
II. THE HISTORICAL TREND IN FLORIDA
The first comprehensive rules of criminal procedure in Florida were
promulgated by the supreme court effective January 1, 1968. 22 Previ-
ously, various statutes governed criminal procedure in Florida, but they
were silent as to discovery depositions. 23 The 1968 rules, however, pro-
vided for discovery depositions, though not as a matter of general right.
Rather, the defense was required to request and obtain a court order,
issued only upon a showing that the testimony of the person to be de-
posed was material, relevant, or of assistance in the preparation of the
defense, and that the witness would not cooperate in giving a voluntary,
signed, written statement to the defendant or his attorney4
Hence, the 1968 Florida rule incorporated a compromise position that
the defendant should have the same ability that the state would have to
take testimony under oath from non-cooperating witnesses. 2 However,
20. The 1978 commentary reads as follows:
The shift to open file disclosure is the result, in part, of changing attitudes toward
discovery. Some of the traditional reasons for denying or restricting discovery have been
the fear that pretrial disclosure will subject victims and witnesses to threats or other
abuse, will lead to the loss or destruction of physical evidence, or will otherwise ad-
versely affect the integrity of the case to be presented at trial. However, experience with
broad discovery suggests that discovery does not pose such problems in the majority of
cases and that protective orders are an appropriate method of coping with the occasional
case in which pretrial disclosures will jeopardize victims, witnesses, or evidence. As a
result, paragraph (a) establishes open file disclosure as the rule to be applied in ordinary
cases, while standard 11-4.4 authorizes the use of protective orders to accommodate the
"legitimate needs of exceptional cases."
STANDARuS FOR CBIuIN.,j. JUSTICE § 11-2.1(a) commentary at 11-17 (Supp. 1986) (footnotes omit-
ted).
21. See id. § 11.
22. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967).
23. In 1954, the court promulgated rules of civil procedure, apparently under its inherent rule
making powers. See, e.g., Humphries v. Hester, 103 Fla. 1079, 141 So. 749 (1932). The specific
constitutional provision giving the supreme court authority to promulgate rules of procedure was
added to the Constitution in 1956. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3. The court, however, did not promul-
gate rules of criminal procedure until 1967. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d
124 (Fla. 1967). Prior to this promulgation, there were two rules of procedure: Rule One governing
post-conviction relief, and Rule Two governing student practice before the court. These became
Rules 1.850 and 1.860 in the 1968 rules. See FLA. R. Cind. P. 1.850, .860 (1968).
24. FLA. R. CWA. P. 1.220(f) (1968).
25. See id. Section 27.04, Florida Statutes, provides that the state attorney may summon wit-
nesses to testify under oath. Section 914.04 authorizes a witness compelled to testify under the
former provision to receive "use and derivative use" immunity. Id.
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if witnesses were willing to "cooperate" with defense counsel, no depo-
sition right existed.26
In 1972, the supreme court promulgated a thorough revision of the
1968 rules.2 7 The amendments to the discovery rule relied heavily on the
ABA Standards regarding disclosure to the defense. However, the su-
preme court's amendments departed from the ABA Standards by pro-
viding for depositions as a matter of right and without court order.2
Regarding this important change, the 1972 committee notes state, in
awkward terms, only the following:
Not recommended by [ABA] Standards. Previously permitted under
Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.220(f) except for change limiting
the place of taking the deposition and eliminating requirement that
witness refuse to give voluntary signed statement.29
Thus, discovery depositions as a matter of right entered the law of Flor-
ida Criminal Procedure without much officially reported debate.
The 1972 discovery deposition provision has remained essentially un-
changed, with the exception of two amendments made in 1986 in re-
sponse to a petition filed by the state attorneysY° One change prohibited
the taking of more than one deposition of the same witness in multi-
defendant or consolidated cases absent consent of the parties or court
order.31 The second change limited transcription of depositions at public
expense to situations where deponents were shown to be material wit-
nesses or where other good cause was shown.12
III. PASSAGE OF TME 1988 CONCURRENT RESOLUTIoN
The move to abolish discovery depositions during the 1988 session
had significant legislative support. Senator Robert Johnson 3 proposed
26. See FLA. R. Cmn. P. 1.220(f) (1968). Curiously, I uncovered no case law construing the
term "cooperate" under the 1968 rule. One would have thought this to be a controversial question.
27. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972), modified, In re
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1973). Prior to this revision the discov-
ery deposition rule, then numbered 1.220(0, was amended once, merely to place parentheses
around the following phrase: "other than a confidential informer who will not be a witness at the
trial[.]" In Re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 211 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1968).
28. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d at 107. Some of those who served on the Florida
Supreme Court's Rules Committee have said the deposition rule was amended at the instance of the
trial court judges who claimed that under the 1968 rule they were regularly granting motions for
depositions. The trial court judges, therefore, believed the court order requirement had become
surplusage and that the rule should be amended to reflect reality: i.e., depositions were being
granted as a matter of right.
29. Id. at 110.
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an abolition statute in the Senate which was approved by both the Judi-
ciary-Criminal Committee and the Judiciary-Civil Committee with only
one dissent. 4 Representative John Renke&5 proposed in the House the
same legislation which had passed through the Crimes, Penalties and
Prosecutions Subcommittee of the Criminal Justice Committee by a 5-0
vote.3 6 The House Criminal Justice Committee, however, rejected the
abolition proposal in favor of the Concurrent Resolution, which was
ultimately passed by both legislative chambers.17
Under the Florida Constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida has
exclusive jurisdiction to enact rules of procedure. 8 The legislature has
no constitutional authority to enact procedural legislation, but may re-
peal rules of procedure by a two-thirds vote of each chamber.3 9 Some
observers speculated that the abolition proposals never had a realistic
chance of passing both chambers by the required two-thirds vote and
were designed to "send a message" to the supreme court.
If so, the content of the message was unclear. Undoubtedly many
proponents of abolition, including some legislators, favored total repeal.
However, as reflected in the committee debates, legislators and even
some advocates of repeal were seeking substantial changes in the deposi-
tion process, but not its complete elimination. Even if the abolition pro-
posals never had a realistic chance of passage, they generated
considerable concern at the committee and subcommittee levels. These
meetings were well attended and extensive testimony was given by vic-
tims' rights representatives, state attorneys, public defenders, and the
private defense bar.
The Concurrent Resolution does nothing more than request the su-
preme court to consider problems relating to discovery depositions,
which it had been asked to do only three years before. In 1985 the state
attorneys of Florida filed a petition with the supreme court requesting
the appointment of a commission to study discovery depositions.4 The
supreme court instead referred the state attorneys' petition to the Crimi-
34. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1988 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BnILS at
64, SB 291. Senator Peter Weinstein, Dem., Tamarac, cast the sole dissenting vote in both commit-
tees.
35. Repub., New Port Richey.
36. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1988 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BLLS at
240, HB 1106.
37. Id.
38. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
39. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
40. In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 498 So. 2d 875 (Fla.
1986).
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nal Procedure Rules Committee4l (Committee), which recommended
two relatively minor amendments subsequently adopted by the court.4 2
In its report to the supreme court which accompanied its proposed
amendments, the Committee stated that a subcommittee had considered
and rejected various other proposals which consequently never were sub-
mitted to the full Committee for consideration.43 One proposed amend-
ment would have forbidden the use of discovery depositions at trial for
impeachment." Another would have limited depositions to people
named in the charging document, people designated by the prosecutor as
eyewitnesses, or law enforcement officers with primary investigative au-
thority. 45 The two amendments which were submitted to and adopted by
the full Committee, and ultimately adopted by the supreme court-limi-
ting both multiple depositions of the same witness and the transcription
of depositions at public expense-obviously were rather mild in compar-
ison. This is not surprising given the general view of the Committee:
The discussion within the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee was
on two levels. First, there was majority agreement that Rule 3.220 was
functioning well and not in need of major revision. Second, the
perception of the Supreme Court, the elected State Attorneys and the
public (represented by the legislature), may be different, and that the
committee should work to propose the minimum revisions necessary to
remedy the perceived problems."
The Concurrent Resolution reflects a serious difference of opinion be-
tween the 1988 Legislature and the 1986 Criminal Procedure Rules
Committee. The Committee as a whole perceived no systemic problems
with depositions. Although it recognized and dealt with the significant
costs accrued in transcribing immaterial depositions, the Committee
wholly failed to consider those costs incurred by the diversion of police
41. Id. The supreme court dealt with this petition as prescribed by Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.130-Procedure for Amending Rules, which specifies that rule amendment pro-
posals should be submitted to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee. This committee is ap-
pointed by the President of The Florida Bar and consists of state attorneys, public defenders,
private defense counsel, judges and law professors. FLA. R. JuD. ADmIN. 2.130(4).
42. In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 498 So. 2d 875 (Fla.
1986). See infra text accompanying note 46.
43. Response of Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to Petition for Appointment of Com-
mission to Study Discovery Procedures in Florida, Case Nos. 68,269-270 (1986) [hereinafter Rules
Committee Response] (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
44. Id. at 3. Currently, discovery depositions may not be used as substantive evidence in a
criminal trial. State v. James, 402 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1981). It is interesting to note, however, that
under the terms of the hearsay exception for former testimony, discovery depositions would seem
to be admissible. See FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(a) (1987).
45. Rules Committee Response, supra note 43, at 3-4.
46. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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resources. 47 The only attention the Committee gave to witness harass-
ment was the recommended prohibition against multiple depositions of
the same witness.4
The Concurrent Resolution clearly reflects a sentiment within the Leg-
islature that the amendments proposed by the Criminal Procedure Rules
Committee and adopted by the court in 1986 are inadequate to deal with
the perceived problems in discovery depositions. Additionally, the Con-
current Resolution suggests that the necessary drastic revision, if not ab-
olition, of the discovery deposition process must come from some group
other than the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee. 49
IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST REPEAL
The advocates for repealing discovery depositions were the elected
state attorneys, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE),
local law enforcement agencies, and victims' rights representatives. In
support of their proposal to abolish discovery depositions, these groups
focused principally on two features of the current system: the significant
costs of discovery depositions and the use of depositions to harass wit-
nesses. The FDLE stated that depositions consume more than 750,000
law enforcement man-hours per year (enough man-hours to staff a po-
lice agency approximately the size of the Orlando, Florida, Police De-
partment). The FDLE contended as well that, by conservative estimates,
"over $35.6 million in state and local funds are expended annually by
law enforcement, prosecutors, and public defenders for their participa-
tion in criminal discovery depositions."5° The FDLE estimated these fig-
ures based on responses to surveys mailed to law enforcement agencies,5'
leading those favoring retention of depositions to question the accuracy
of the figures.12 Whatever the real figures are, it seems clear that law
enforcement officers spend considerable time in depositions, a costly di-
version of their efforts from other law enforcement responsibilities.53
47. See id.
48. Id. at2.
49. The membership of the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee has changed considerably
since the 1986 amendments to Rule 3.220. Present Committee membership includes 17 prosecutors,
13 defense counsel, and 12 judges and law professors. The Chairman of the Committee is Professor
Gerald Bennett from the University of Florida College of Law.
50. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, DISCOVERING THE INJUsTICE: CRIMINAL DEPosrrIONS IN
FLORIDA 5 (1987) [hereinafter DscovEsNG T=E INJUSTICE].
51. Id. at 19-20.
52. FLA. ASs'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SUNSHINE: DEPOSI-
TIONS IN CRiMNAL CASES 10-19 (1988) [hereinafter CRMNAL JUSTICE IN T=E SUNsRSNE]. See Biz-
zaro, Guidelines and Depositions Survive Session, Fla. Bar News, June 15, 1988, at 3, col. 4.
53. Much police enforcement activity is at night. Depositions are scheduled during the day.
Hence, many police depositions occur during off-duty hours. The standard police officers' collec-
tive bargaining agreement requires a minimum of two hours overtime for any off-duty court ap-
pearance.
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The supporters of depositions vigorously countered the cost argument
by asserting that the actual cost of depositions is quite low, ranging
from $39.57 per case in Dade County to $6.34 per case in Escambia
County.14 These figures, however, include only the costs of witness fees,
court reporters, and transcriptions-not the salaries of prosecutors, pub-
lic defenders, and, most importantly, police officers who attend deposi-
tions.55 The supporters of depositions also argued that abolition of
discovery depositions would lead to an increased number of trials.16 The
costs incurred due to the additional trials, they argued, would outweigh
any savings obtained by abolishing depositions."
In support of their argument that criminal depositions are often used
to harass victims and witnesses, the abolitionists presented extensive tes-
timony chronicling such abuse. 8 Supporters of depositions responded
that these instances, if they occurred, were insufficiently commonplace
to warrant abolishing all criminal depositions. Supporters also pointed
out that the existing rule provides for judicial protective orders when
necessary to curb abuse. 9
One argument not seriously pressed by the abolitionists was that dep-
ositions confer an undeserved advantage upon the defense, as the Con-
stitution gives no right to discovery depositions to the accused. The only
discovery constitutionally mandated in criminal cases is the accused's
due process right to disclosure by the prosecution of evidence or infor-
mation favorable to the accused on the issues of guilt or punishment.6
The opportunity for full discovery of the state's case by compelled testi-
mony prior to trial confers significant advantages on the defense. Dis-
covery affords the accused the ability to develop the contours of the
defense strategy and, perhaps more importantly, to gather impeachment
material.6 ' These advantages undoubtedly contribute, to some extent, to
trial outcomes beneficial to the defense, and may even bestow a certain
leverage on the accused in plea bargaining. A legislature bent on the
efficient prosecution of criminals should respond warmly to an argu-
ment that defendants should not enjoy these advantages.
54. CRAGNAL JUSTICE N THE SUNsHINE, supra note 52, at 10.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 15-19.
57. Id.
58. See DIscovERINo THE INJUSTICE, supra note 50.
59. CRniNAL JUSTICE IN THE SUNsHINE, supra note 52, at 19-22.
60. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Arango v. State, 497 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1986).
61. It is a well-known reality to trial lawyers that each additional time a witness recounts
events, the chances improve that some inconsistencies will be found, even if on relatively insignifi-
cant details. Defense lawyers encountering a particularly strong prosecution case often resort to
emphasizing these inconsistencies to convince the jury that a reasonable doubt exists.
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One can only speculate as to why this consideration was not the cen-
terpiece of the abolitionist argument. Perhaps the prime movers for abo-
lition were the police organizations and victims' rights representatives,
and not the elected state attorneys, who may have assumed a leadership
role primarily for political purposes. Law enforcement interests and vic-
tims' rights organizations naturally would emphasize diversion of police
resources and harassment. It must be remembered, however, that it was
the elected state attorneys who in 1985 began the attack on depositions
by petitioning the supreme court for changes in the rule. 62
The legislative battle may be viewed as a struggle to occupy the high
moral plane. Abolitionists may have intentionally avoided an argument
which would have raised questions of essential fairness to the defendant
or the symmetry between the civil and criminal systems. It is easier to
focus on the outrageous abuses than on the difficult jurisprudential issue
of where the balance of advantage should lie in criminal prosecutions.
It may be simply that depositions do not affect outcomes as much as
one may think. This, if true, would appear to strengthen the abolition
argument. Why suffer the needless costs of depositions if they do not
affect the balance of advantage?63
On the other side, advocates of depositions might have argued that
depositions do confer a substantial advantage on the accused, but that it
is one defendants ought to have in a fair system of justice. That conten-
tion, however, comes perilously close to an implication that some guilty
parties are receiving less than their just deserts because Florida allows
discovery depositions. It would be preposterous to believe that deposi-
tions benefit only the innocent, and it is unlikely that the Legislature
would embrace an argument asking for procedural advantages for the
criminally accused.
In sum, there were good reasons for both sides to avoid the issue of
whether, as a matter of public policy or essential justice, defendants in
Florida ought to have the deposition power as a matter of right. In any
event, the contesting sides focused their legislative arguments on the
costs and alleged harassment, and not on public policy or fairness.
62. Rules Committee Response, supra note 43, at 1.
63. I was unable to obtain data on acquittal rates in Florida prior to 1978. Data provided by
the Florida State Courts Administrator for 1978-1987 reveal that felony jury trial acquittals have
drastically decreased on a percentage basis from 1978 to 1987. In 1978, 82,069 total felony disposi-
tions included 904, or 1.1%, jury trial acquittals. In 1987, 196,707 total felony dispositions in-
cluded 1337, or 0.7%, jury trial acquittals. State Courts Administrator, Table of Felony
Dispositions by Type (Oct., 1988) (on file with the State Courts Administrator, Florida Supreme
Court). This suggests that discovery depositions, which were available at all times within this pe-
riod, may not be a very significant factor in acquittals, or at least that other variables are strongly
operative.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY LEGISLATIVE ARGUMENTS BEBIND THE
ABOLITION MOVEMENT
Since the Legislature saw fit to address only two primary issues re-
garding the use of discovery depositions in criminal cases-the cost of
depositions and the potential for harassment of witnesses-it is appro-
priate to analyze those issues in greater detail.
A. Reflections on the Cost Arguments in the Statistical Void
The contending sides made many assertions about the respective costs
and savings to the system attributable to discovery depositions, yet nei-
ther side offered much persuasive supporting evidence. Hence it would
have been impossible for the Legislature to make an informed decision
on this basis.
As mentioned above, the FDLE report suggested a $36.5 million fig-
ure for lost police man-hours based on estimates received from law en-
forcement agencies.64 Although there appears to be a significant loss
involved here, the actual magnitude is unknown. Raw numbers which
look quite large can become quite small when expressed as a percentage
of a total budget.
The supporters of depositions countered the cost argument with the
claim that discovery depositions actually save money by facilitating
pleas, thereby avoiding the expense of a trial in many cases.6 5 They also
argued that without the right to depositions, the defense would force
discovery in other pre-trial hearings on various motions, requiring the
same attendance not only by police officers, but also by judges, court
personnel, lawyers and other witnesses. So, to the extent that real dis-
covery was lost, trial costs would increase. To the extent that discovery
shifted to other proceedings, costs would increase as well.6
The claims by either side are not intuitively obvious and are not sup-
ported by empirical evidence. The overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions do not provide discovery depositions and do not experience
crippling trial rates. The supporters of depositions relied on a study
done by Professor David B. Griswold, who obtained data from the Na-
tional Center for State Courts showing statistics on criminal depositions
64. DISCOVERING THE INJUSTICE, supra note 50, at 19-22. Although police agencies should be
able to report expenditures accurately for overtime payments to police officers for court appear-
ances, many do not break this figure down for the type of court appearance: i.e., a deposition, a
pre-trial hearing, or a trial. Further, on-duty court appearances, and the actual time lost thereby,
would not appear as an additional budget expenditure.
65. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SuNsHiNE, supra note 52, at 10-19.
66. Id.
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reported by various state court agencies. 67 Based on this data, Professor
Griswold attempted to show that jurisdictions with depositions 6 enjoy a
higher guilty plea rate than do those without. Unfortunately, gaps in the
reporting system did not allow Professor Griswold to select a broad
sample of jurisdictions without depositions, 69 or to report on other juris-
dictions with depositions regarding guilty plea rates in their courts of
general felony jurisdiction. 70 Further, many jurisdictions did not report
any data, and as is typical with cross-jurisdictional studies of this type,
there is doubt that the same criteria were used in the reporting.
More fundamentally, the guilty plea rate is a function of many varia-
bles, not the least of which are the docket backlogs in particular jurisdic-
tions, the tendency of judges to impose harsher sentences after
conviction by a jury, and prosecutorial policies on plea bargaining. 7
Even if one had confidence in the underlying statistics, and the statistics
were sufficiently complete to obtain broad samples for comparison,
there remains the obvious problem that the plea rate may be determined
by more significant variables than the presence or absence of deposi-
tions. A quick review of the National Center for State Courts data illus-
trates this well. 72 Neither South Dakota nor Virginia has depositions.
According to the figures, the misdemeanor plea rates in the two states
are 98% and 55070, respectively. 73 When rates differ so significantly, it is
obvious that vast discrepancies in plea rates occur for reasons other than
whether a state has criminal defense depositions. Any comparisons
based on small samples are necessarily suspect.
The supporters of depositions also relied on data showing an average
77.5% plea rate in federal criminal prosecutions in Florida, in which
there are no discovery depositions. 74 The supporters of depositions made
the following conclusion:
On average, 22% of the Federal cases in Florida went to trial during
this period. In Broward County, only 7% of the felony cases went to
trial. Without depositions, the percentage of trials in the State system
67. Griswold, Criminal Depositions in Florida: Retention or Repeal? (Feb. 1988) (draft availa-
ble through author, Dep't. of Criminal Justice, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Fla.).
68. See supra note 1.
69. For courts of general felony jurisdiction, for example, Professor Griswold compared Flor-
ida with only Delaware, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Griswold, supra note 67,
at 14.
70. See id.
71. Professor Griswold stated: "A further caveat is that we are examining two variable rela-
tionships which could be affected by one or more additional variables." Id. at 4.
72. See id. at 12-18.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Cam.AL JUSTICE IN THE SuNsriuE, supra note 52, at 12.
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would likely rise to the Federal level, and there would have been 1500
felony cases tried in Broward County alone-three times the number of
cases tried in the entire Federal system in Florida during the same
period. With 19 other State circuits also trying 22% of their cases, the
sheer number of trials would have a crippling effect on our justice
system, and it would eventually collapse under its own weight. 71
Once again, this analysis assumes that the plea rate is solely, or primar-
ily, a function of the availability of depositions to the accused. It would
seem at least equally plausible that the lower plea rate in federal prose-
cutions could result from the different sentencing practices of judges
coupled with an unwillingness of federal prosecutors to offer significant
inducements in plea bargaining.
The proponents of depositions argued that if testimonial discovery
were not provided by deposition there would be irresistible pressure to
provide it elsewhere in the proceedings, such as in adversarial prelimi-
nary hearings or in hearings on motions to suppress or dismiss.7 6 Un-
doubtedly there would be such efforts, but it is not clear that they would
succeed. There is no constitutional right to an adversarial preliminary
hearing to determine probable cause, 77 and Florida procedure provides
such a hearing only in the limited case of the state's failure to file formal
charges within twenty-one days of arrest. 71
A motion to dismiss on the ground that the facts do not establish a
prima facie case must be accompanied by a sworn statement of the un-
disputed facts. 79 If the state traverses this motion (i.e., does not admit
the facts as sworn to in the motion), the motion must be denied.8° Thus,
a hearing on such a motion involves only legal issues, and does not pro-
vide defense counsel the opportunity to examine state witnesses. A hear-
ing on a motion to suppress evidence or a confession would provide
only a limited opportunity to examine the officers involved, and it is
unlikely that many groundless motions would be filed simply to obtain
discovery. There would always have to be either a statement obtained or
some evidence seized as a basis for such a motion, and in these circum-
stances a motion to suppress would probably be made anyway.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 16-17.
77. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
78. FLA. R. Cium. P. 3.133(b).
79. FLA. R. Ctim. P. 3.190(c)(4).
80. FLA. R. Caim. P. 3.190(d) (a motion to dismiss "shall be denied if the State files a traverse
which with specificity denies under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dis-
miss"). For further discussion on how the state may traverse a motion to dismiss, see State v.
Fadden, 466 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), where a state's traverse was held proper when it
created a "disputed factual issue ... as to some fact essential to the establishment of a legally
sufficient affirmative defense." Id. at 1095.
1988]
690 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:675
In sum, discovery depositions undoubtedly cause some, and perhaps a
substantial, diversion of police resources from other law enforcement
functions. However, the magnitude and significance of that diversion is
unclear. It is equally unclear how the abolition of depositions would
affect the rest of the system. Given the lack of significant empirical
data, it would have been impossible for the legislature to have made an
informed cost-based decision.
One significant cost-related argument not raised by the legislature was
the effect abolition of depositions would have on public defenders. Al-
though abolishing depositions might not drastically change the way a
public defender's office operates, it could force a reduction in the case-
load for each public defender or a reduction in the quality of service. To
maintain quality without reduced caseloads, the offices would be forced
to hire more defenders and investigators, thus adding expenses to the
system.81 If nothing else, the ability to depose prosecution witnesses both
simplifies and regularizes the process of discovery. With depositions, the
vagaries and wiles of "discovery on the hoof" are avoided, time is con-
served, and difficult judgment calls are bypassed. This "bureaucratiza-
tion" of the process may be the principal contribution of depositions to
the defense system, as opposed to, for instance, the conferring of any
particular advantage in litigation. In any case, the legislature heard no
evidence on comparative caseloads for public defenders in Florida and
in other jurisdictions without depositions. Yet this would be the most
significant and probable cost of abolishing depositions in criminal cases.
B. Reflections on the Harassment of Victims and Witnesses
Abolitionists argued strenuously to the legislature that depositions fre-
quently, if not typically, are used to harass victims and witnesses, either
to deter them from testifying at trial or at least to evaluate their ability
to withstand strenuous cross-examination.82 Supporters of depositions
responded that such instances were aberrational, and that depositions
often revealed facts demonstrating the innocence of the accused.
83
It is probably not possible to develop meaningful data relevant to the
alleged harassment of witnesses. 4 There is one indication that victim/
81. It may be no coincidence that the enactment of depositions and the institution of the
public defender system in Florida came only four years apart. In 1963, the Legislature authorized a
public defender for each judicial circuit. Ch. 63-409, 1963 Fla. Laws 1091. In 1967, the supreme
court promulgated the state's first comprehensive rules of criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967).
82. DiscOvERiNG THE INrUSTICE, supra note 50, at 15-16.
83. CRMBAtL JUSTICE IN THE SuNsHUE, supra note 52, at 7-9.
84. The abolitionists also argued that depositions were often used simply to delay trials. It
may be possible to develop data on the frequency and duration of defense continuances, and per-
haps even those continuances attributable to the need to take depositions, but none was presented.
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witness harassment may not be the intransigent systemic problem por-
trayed by the abolitionists, however. Rule 3.220(a)(4), Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, vests in courts the power to delay or restrict disclo-
sures if there is "substantial risk to any person of physical harm, intimi-
dation ... or unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment resulting from
such disclosure, which outweighs any usefulness of the disclosure to de-
fense counsel.'"'8 Nevertheless, there is no indication in reported deci-
sions that the prosecution has attempted to use this rule to prevent the
"harassment" in depositions of either victims or witnesses.
Arguably, before "harassment" has reached an intolerable level, there
should be some indication that the process of judicial supervision has
proved inadequate. To this end, the Miami Chamber of Commerce has
made the following argument: "Motions for protective orders are sel-
dom made by prosecutors because they are seldom granted by trial
judges who, because of the language of the Rule, construe it liberally in
favor of the right it was intended to secure.' '86 While this may or may
not be true, appellate decisions show that the prosecution has not been
loath to seek judicial review of pre-trial orders in other contexts. 7 If
trial judges have refused to protect victims and witnesses from harass-
ment in the deposition process, one would expect some evidence of this
in reported appellate decisions. Yet no such evidence exists.
Defining "harassment" is problematic as well. The inherent un-
pleasantness of testifying under oath may be considered "harass-
ment" by some individuals. Just where legitimate discovery leaves
off and "harassment" begins is a disputable line. For example, the
FDLE points to incidents involving child victims of sexual battery."8
In this area, both discovery rules and recent legislation protect vic-
tims from harassment.8 9 It may be that the paucity of judicial protec-
tive orders is more a function of the aforementioned definitional
problem than of the unwillingness of judges to protect against obvi-
ous abuse. If we are to have depositions, "unpleasantness" is an in-
85. FLA. R. CluM. P. 3.220(a)(4).
86. Petition of The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, Inc. to Amend Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.220(d), Case No. 71,901 at 15 (Fla. 1988) (on file with Clerk, Supreme Court
of Florida).
87. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972) (review of a trial court's order that
eyewitnesses submit to an eye examination).
88. DiscovERING THE INJUSTICE, supra note 50, at 16.
89. Section 914.16, Florida Statutes, grants judicial authority to set, by order, reasonable lim-
its on the number of interviews a victim of child or sexual abuse must submit to for law enforce-
ment or discovery purposes. Rule 3.220(a)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows the
court to "deny or partially restrict" depositions where "there is a substantial risk to any person of
...intimidation.., or embarrasment which outweighs any usefulness of the disclosure to defense
counsel."
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evitable cost. Available evidence suggests that the real argument of
those favoring abolition may be founded more on the inherent un-
pleasantness of being deposed than on any demonstrated abuse.
VI. MODIFICATION PROBABLY LIES AHEAD
As of the time of this writing, the supreme court has complied
with the Legislature's Concurrent Resolution and appointed the
Commission on Criminal Discovery to study depositions." The
Commission could recommend total abolition of discovery deposi-
tions, modifications to the process, or retention of the status quo.
Retention of the status quo certainly would result in renewed efforts
in the next legislative session to repeal discovery depositions. Given
this reality, it seems unlikely that either the Commission will recom-
mend or the supreme court will accept the status quo.
Abolition seems equally unlikely. Even the legislative debates re-
vealed that many of the important participants disfavored abolition
of discovery depositions. Although there was some legislative senti-
ment for complete repeal, the prevailing view was that discovery dep-
ositions should continue to be available on some basis in Florida
criminal prosecutions. The statutory proposals to abolish depositions
may have been considered vehicles to motivate reform by the su-
preme court.
Thus, modification is the next probable step. Two principle over-
lapping areas of modification appear likely: (1) changes to limit the
harassment of witnesses and victims; and (2) changes to reduce the
costs of depositions in terms of diverted police resources.
The Concurrent Resolution suggests barring the defendant from
attending discovery depositions unless good cause is shown. 91 Should
such a measure be ultimately adopted, certain defense strategies
would seem likely. For example, the defense would argue that the
presence of the defendant is vital to assist in the questioning of wit-
nesses and victims. If this fails to convince the judge, motions for
multiple depositions of the same witness may result. In any event,
such a provision would shift the burden from the prosecution to
show cause to exclude the defendant, to the defense to show cause to
include the defendant. Excluding the defendant from some or all
depositions raises the issue of the defendant's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him.92 Although the defendant cer-
90. See supra note 3.
91. HCR 1679, Reg. Sess., 1988 Fla. Laws 2442.
92. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
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tainly has a right to confront his accusers at trial, 93 this right may not
extend to discovery proceedings which are not constitutionally man-
dated. 94 Since Florida could totally abolish discovery depositions
without constitutional implication, it should be able to provide for
them on a qualified basis.
Amending the rule to minimize the taking of unnecessary deposi-
tions, particularly of police witnesses, will prove a challenging task
indeed. One possibility is to return to the rule which prevailed from
1968 to 1972, under which depositions could be taken only upon
court order if the witness refused voluntarily to give a statement and
the testimony was material. 95 This approach is unattractive because
of the judicial time involved. Many witnesses probably will not coop-
erate voluntarily with defense counsel, resulting in a multitude of mo-
tions requesting compelled depositions.
Another approach would be to allow depositions as of right of cer-
tain groups of witnesses. The difficult task here would be to define
the groups involved. However groups are defined, it would be neces-
sary to assume a good faith effort of the prosecution to designate
those witnesses who qualify for deposition. One suggestion has been
to limit depositions as of right to eyewitnesses and the principal in-
vestigating police officer. 96 Another possibility, one which would
provide for broader discovery, would be to allow depositions as of
right of all anticipated prosecution witnesses, and of any people des-
ignated by the prosecution as having information which might be fa-
vorable to the accused on questions of guilt or punishment. A
further modification would be to allow the prosecutor to designate
trial witnesses who will give non-controversial or routine testi-
mony-for example, a chain of custody witness-and to prohibit
depositions of these trial witnesses as well, absent a court order upon
a showing of good cause.
The assumption of this latter approach is that any witness who will
testify for the prosecution on a material matter is significant enough
to depose. Depositions are useful for discovery and impeachment,
and these justifications would seem to warrant deposing trial wit-
nesses. This approach would require some change in the other disclo-
sures presently made by the prosecution, however. Under the current
93. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
94. A defendant is not entitled under the Constitution to be present during discovery proceed-
ings, as long as the deponent testifies at trial and is available for cross-examination. State v. Dolen,
390 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
95. FLA. R. CUM. P. 1.220 (1968).
96. Rules Committee Response, supra note 43, at 3-4.
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rule the state must disclose only a list of people who may have infor-
mation relevant to the offense. 97 This list is not necessarily a witness
list. In fact, the prosecutorial practice has been to make this list all-
inclusive so that it does not indicate who the state witnesses will be
or otherwise indicate their importance. Should the discovery deposi-
tion rule be modified in this fashion, it would require the prosecu-
tion to make good faith disclosure of their probable witnesses.
Whatever adversarial advantage this confers on the defense, argua-
bly it would result in significant savings in the taking of unnecessary
depositions of witnesses who will not testify at trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1988 Florida Legislature's consideration of legislative propos-
als to repeal discovery depositions in criminal cases resulted in a
Concurrent Resolution asking the Supreme Court of Florida to con-
sider changing the discovery deposition process. Although many op-
ponents of discovery depositions undoubtedly sought abolition, the
principal legislative motivation was to stimulate reform by the su-
preme court. The nature of that reform remains to be seen. Aboli-
tion on the one hand, or retention of the status quo on the other, are
both unlikely. Significant changes and restrictions on the deposition
process can be anticipated. Most probably these will be directed to
limiting the perceived harassment of witnesses and reducing the cost
of unnecessary depositions.
97. FLA. R. Clwm. P. 3.220(a)(1)(i).
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ADDENDUM
Subsequent to the preparation of this Article, the Criminal Discovery Commission submit-
ted its report to the Supreme Court of Florida. CRIMINAL DISCOVERY COMMISSION, REPORT OF
THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY (Feb. 1, 1989) (on file
with State Courts Administrator, Supreme Court of Florida). The Commission's primary
finding was that although discovery depositions are "not required as a matter of right under
the federal or state constitutions, (they] make a unique and significant contribution to a fair
and economically efficient determination of factual issues in the criminal process." Id. at 20.
Criminal discovery depositions, the Commission concluded, "should be retained as part of
Florida's Criminal Justice process and should not be abolished or significantly curtailed." Id.
The Commission nevertheless identified problems with the current process-the excessive cost
to law enforcement agencies, Id. at 20, and the "infrequent, although serious, instances of
witness abuse," Id. at 21, and recommended changes designed to eliminate those problems.
With respect to reducing costs, the Commission focused on attempting to eliminate depo-
sitions perceived to be "unnecessary" or "non-productive." Id. at 75. The primary recom-
mendation was to amend Rule 3.220 "to provide that a defendant does not have the right to
depose all witnesses as a matter of course." Id. The defendant who elects to participate in
discovery of any kind would be required to file a "Notice of Discovery." Id. at 75-76. The
prosecution then would be required to furnish the defendant with a list of all persons having
knowledge of the case, designating "those persons whose deposition is believed in good faith
to be unnecessary" because their function was ministerial or they are'not reasonably expected
to be called to testify. Id. at 76. Depositions of these persons would not be allowed "until
after a conference is held between the prosecutor and defense counsel and, in the event agree-
ment is not reached, the prosecutor has had an opportunity to seek a protective order." Id.
The Commission also recommended that existing witness coordination offices be more fully
utilized, and that depositions of law enforcement officers be scheduled through those offices.
Id. at 77. Finally, a police officer would be permitted, upon stipulation of counsel and con-
sent of the witness, to make a telephone statement in lieu of giving a deposition. Id. at 78.
The most significant Commission recommendation relating to the protection of witnesses
and victims involves the right of the defendant to attend a deposition. A defendant who in-
tends to attend a deposition would be required to notify the prosecuting attorney, who could
then object to the defendant's physical presence. Id. at 62. If the prosecuting attorney objects,
the defendant could move for an order "permitting physical presence of the defendant upon a
showing of good cause." Id. at 63. In ruling on such a motion, the court would consider "the
need for the physical presence of the defendant to obtain effective discovery and the intimi-
dating effect of the defendant's presence on the witness and the cost." Id. The court also
would consider "alternative electronic or audio/visual means to protect the defendant's abil-
ity to participate in discovery without his physical presence." Id.
To provide protection for child victims and witnesses, the Commission recommended that
"chief judges in circuits which have not already done so should enter an order restricting
contact with child victims and witnesses to crimes" pursuant to section 92.55, Florida Sta-
tutes. Id. at 62. The Commission also recommended that "[aippropriate statutory or rule
changes should be entered emphasizing the [existing] right and duty of the prosecuting attor-
ney attending a deposition to protect the rights of the witness at that deposition." Id. at 63.

